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This paper studies the impact of daily official foreign exchange interventions on the Czech 
koruna’s exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro (the German mark prior to 1999) from 1997 to 2002. 
Both the event study methodology, extended with official interest rate moves, and a variety of 
GARCH models reveal that central bank interventions, especially koruna purchases, seem to 
have been relatively ineffective from 1997 to mid-1998 compared to the size of the 
interventions. From mid-1998 to 2002, however, koruna sales turn out to be effective in 
smoothing the path of the exchange rate up to 60 days. Nevertheless, the event study approach 
indicates that the success of FX interventions may be intimately related to the coordination of 
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This paper studies the impact of daily official foreign exchange interventions on the Czech 
koruna's exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro (the German mark prior to 1999) from 1997 to 2002. We 
first apply the event study approach by also accounting for the role of official interest rate moves, 
and then employ a range of GARCH models to analyse the influence of official interventions on 
the mean and variance of the koruna's exchange rate vis-à-vis the German mark prior to 1999 and 
the euro after 1999. 
The event study approach indicates that the foreign exchange interventions of the Czech National 
Bank were not particularly effective in the aftermath of the currency crisis from 1997 to mid-
1998. Importantly, koruna purchases seem to have been almost always rather ineffective, whereas 
koruna sales resulted in exchange rate smoothing or leaning against the wind in the very short run. 
The GARCH estimation results broadly confirm these results, as koruna purchases were usually 
associated not with an appreciation but with a depreciation of the koruna. Koruna sales either had 
no impact or were associated with an appreciation of the exchange rate from 1997 to 1998, 
signalling failure.  
However, from mid-1998 to 2002, the interventions – exclusively koruna sales – turn out to have 
been more successful in reversing the appreciation trend of the koruna in the short run and in 
smoothing the exchange rate at longer horizons up to 60 days. The econometric evidence indicates 
that koruna sales had a positive relationship to the exchange rate from mid-1998 to 2002. 
Our analysis also shows that the effectiveness of FX interventions is closely linked to interest rate 
policy, as intervention episodes excluding changes in key policy rates seem to be ineffective from 
a statistical viewpoint. Interestingly, the same conclusion can be drawn for interest rate events 
adjusted for the effects of FX interventions. This indicates that interest rate and FX intervention 
policies may lead to more satisfactory outcomes when they are well coordinated, rather than when 
they are relied on separately or in an uncoordinated way. 
Overall, our results suggest that the Czech monetary authorities were capable of altering the level 
of the exchange rate, particularly when trying to dampen appreciation pressures (rather than 
fighting against currency depreciation) in the second half of the period studied. However, this 




Although it is widely acknowledged that unsterilised interventions may well have an influence on 
the exchange rate through changes in relative money supplies, for industrialised OECD economies 
the empirical evidence is fairly mixed regarding the effectiveness of sterilised interventions, 
which can work through the portfolio, signalling and microstructure (or coordination) channels. 
For instance, Aguilar and Nydahl (2000) found limited effectiveness of official interventions for 
Sweden. Morana and Beltratti (2000) report similar results for the USD/DEM exchange rate and 
Brandner et al. (2001) and Brandner and Grech (2002) for the ERM currencies. Brissimis and 
Chionis (2004) suggest that interventions by the ECB were not effective for the yen/euro 
exchange rate. In contrast with these findings stands Fatum (2000), who finds evidence of 
effectiveness for the same currency pair. Ramaswamy and Samiei (2000), Fatum and Hutchison 
(2003) and Brissimis and Chionis (2004) show that sterilised interventions were effective for the 
yen/dollar and yen/euro exchange rates. Finally, Kim et al. (2000), Edison et al. (2003) and 
Rogers and Siklos (2003) report mixed evidence for the case of Australia. Nonetheless, Sarno and 
Taylor (2001) conclude in their literature survey that official interventions may succeed in 
influencing the exchange rate if they are well communicated and are in line with the 
fundamentals. 
Canales-Kriljenko (2003) has recently argued that foreign exchange interventions may be more 
effective in developing and transition economies than in well-established industrialised countries, 
because official interventions may work better in foreign exchange markets with low turnover, 
because the market organisation and the regulatory framework may be more conducive to 
interventions, and because moral suasion may also play a bigger role. Nevertheless, the lack of 
empirical research has long left economists wondering about the empirical relevance of the 
hypothesis of the effectiveness of central bank interventions in developing and emerging market 
economies. This lack of empirical research now seems to be evaporating quickly like a mist at 
sunrise, but the controversy about effectiveness has not lifted. While Domac and Mendoza (2002) 
and Guimaraes and Karacadag (2004) find no convincing evidence in favour of effectiveness for 
the cases of Turkey and Mexico, a string of papers published recently by the Research Department 
of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey provide ample support for the success of FX 
interventions in Turkey (Akinzi et al., 2005a,b; Herrera and Özbay, 2005). Tapia and Tokman 
(2004) suggest that FX interventions are transmitted to the exchange rate when announced 
publicly.
2 Holub (2004) analyses the case of the Czech Republic using monthly data and finds 
some support for the success of FX interventions on the basis of the event study methodology. At 
the same time, Disyatat and Galati (2005) use econometric estimates and show that FX 
interventions only influenced the volatility and not the level of the exchange rate in the same 
country.
3 
                                            
2 BIS (2005) contains descriptive case studies for a large number of emerging economies. 
3 BIS (2005) includes two descriptive case studies for Hungary (for the attack on the stronger edge of the +/-15% 
band in January 2003) and Poland (for the crawling peg regime). Note that Holub (2004) is also included in the 
BIS band. 4   Balázs Égert, Luboš Komárek  
 
 
In this paper, we contribute to this debate by using daily intervention data for the Czech Republic 
from 1997 to 2002. We first apply the event study approach by also accounting for the role of 
official interest rate moves and then employ a range of GARCH models to analyse the influence 
of official interventions on the mean and variance of the koruna’s exchange rate vis-à-vis the 
German mark prior to 1999 and the euro after 1999. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the exchange rate and 
monetary policies and foreign exchange interventions in the Czech Republic. Section 3 presents 
the results of the event study approach. Section 4 contains the estimation results of the 
econometric estimations. Section 5 gives some concluding remarks. 
2. The Role of Foreign Exchange Interventions in the Czech Republic 
2.1 The Monetary Policy Framework and FX Interventions 
Similarly to other transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, monetary policy in 
Czechoslovakia and, after its split-up in 1993, the Czech Republic relied, at the early stages of the 
transition process, on the exchange rate as an intermediate target to achieve price stability. After 
four rounds of devaluation against the currency basket in 1990
4, the Czech(oslovak) koruna’s 
central parity in the pegged system remained unchanged until the introduction of a managed float 
following a currency crisis in 1997. As a result, average yearly inflation – running as high as 
56.6% in 1991, chiefly as a consequence of price liberalisation – was brought down to 10% in 
1994 and was stabilised in high one-digit territory from 1995 to 1997. After a transitional 
recession, real GDP growth recovered from 1993 onwards, reaching 5.9% and 4.2% in 1995 and 
1996 respectively. At the same time, the current account deficit and consolidated government 
deficits were on the rise (see Table 1 below).  
Table 1: Major Annual Macroeconomic Indicators 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Real GDP growth (%)  -1.2  -11.6 -0.5 0.1 2.2 5.9 4.2 -0.7 -1.1 1.2 3.9 2.6 1.5
Unemployment (%)  0.7 4.1 2.6 3.5 3.2 2.9 3.5 5.2 7.5 9.4 8.8 8.9 9.8
Inflation (%)  9.7  56.6 11.1 20.8 10.0 9.1 8.8 8.5 10.7 2.1 3.9 4.7 1.8
Current account deficit (% of GDP)  -1.0  4.5 -1.0 1.3 -1.9 -2.6 -6.7 -6.3 -2.1 -2.5 -4.9 -5.4 -5.6
Government deficit (% of GDP)       -13.4 -3.1 -2.4 -5  -3.6  -3.7  -5.9 -6.8
Stock of FDI (% of GDP)  0.2  2.2 10.4 10.2 10.7 14.3 14.1 16.8 22.6 31.6 38.6 45.2 47.1
Source: Czech National Bank and WIIW. 
Notes: Unemployment is registered unemployment. Labour Force Survey-based unemployment is 
very similar both in levels and in dynamics. Inflation is average annual CPI. Current account 
deficit is in USD. Government deficit is based on ESA 95. 
                                            
4 2 January 1990: 2.1%; 8 January 1990: 16.3%; 15 October 1990: 55.2%; 28 December 1990: 15.9%. The 
currency basket was composed of 32.88% USD, 40.93 % DEM, 12.32% ATS, 4.82% FRF and 9.05% CHF until 
27 December 1990. On 28 December 1990, the weights in the basket were adjusted and the French franc was 
replaced by the British pound: 31.34% USD, 45.52% DEM, 12.35% ATS, 4.24% GBP and 6.55% CHF. On 2 
January 1992, the weights were re-adjusted and the French franc regained its previous position by crowding out 
the British pound: 9.7% USD, 36.15% DEM, 8.07% ATS, 2.92% FRF and 3.79% CHF. Shortly after the 
introduction of the Czech koruna, the basket was simplified to two currencies on 3 May 1993: 35% USD and 
65% DEM. Foreign Exchange Interventions and Interest Rate Policy in the Czech Republic   5 
 
 








































































































































Source: Czech National Bank. 
 
The exchange rate of the koruna against the German mark came increasingly under pressure from 
February 1997 and depreciated by roughly 10% in the three months to May 1997. This 
depreciation was triggered mainly by the coincidence of three factors: a) the delayed response of 
policymakers in dealing with the twin deficits, b) political turbulence, and c) the start of the Asian 
currency crisis in Thailand (Šmídkova et al., 1998). 
The speculative run against the koruna was largely facilitated by extensive capital account 
liberalisation
5, which also opened the door to massive capital inflows, the first consequence of 
which was that the extremely tight fluctuation band of ±1% or less
6 had to be widened to ±7.5% 
on 28 February 1996.
7 
In response to the attack, the Czech National Bank (CNB) intervened massively to support the 
koruna. However, the fall in foreign exchange reserves, the rise in systemic risk due to the huge 
fall in liquidity on the interbank market and the lack of political will to support the peg forced the 
Czech National Bank and the government to abandon the peg and to announce the introduction of 
a managed float on 26 May 1997. The new regime was oriented to the German mark and, after 
1998, the euro (Šmídkova et al., 1998; CNB, 1997, p. 25). 
In the new regime, the CNB strived to stabilise the exchange rate against the German mark and 
announced a target band of 17–19.5 CZK/DEM (33.5–38.5 CZK/EUR). From June to August 
1997, the CNB intervened in both directions to keep the currency in this band and, perhaps more 
so, to smooth the exchange rate, as the koruna did not come close to the announced limits of the 
roughly 13% wide corridor until late November 1997 (Figure 2). With the stabilisation of the 
                                            
5 The Czech Republic complied with Article VIII of the IMF from 1 October 1995 onwards and joined the 
OECD in December 1995. 
6 ±0% until August 1992, ±0.5% from 27 September 1992 to 24 April 1995, ±0.75% from 25 April 1995 to 27 
February 1996 (this widening was due to the fact that the CNB charged an additional 25 p.p. as a fee for trades 
on the market) and ±7.5% from 28 February 1996 to 26 May 1997. 
7 Note also that in 1995 and 1996, the volume traded on the Czech koruna was substantially higher than on any 
other CEE currency except the Russian rouble. 6   Balázs Égert, Luboš Komárek  
 
 
currency achieved in July, the CNB then pumped liquidity into the interbank market to lower 
interest rates. 








































































































































































announced band of 17-19.5 CZK/DEM 
in the floating regime exchange rate peg to 
a currency basket
depreciation of 10% from 
February to May 1997
 
  
Note: Exchange rate developments are depicted relative to the official central parity prevailing in the 
pegged regime. The series refers to the koruna’s exchange rate vis-à-vis the basket under the 
peg, and against the German mark and the euro in the managed float.  
As the exchange rate could no longer serve as an intermediate target, and because money demand 
was too unstable to serve as an anchor, the Czech National Bank at the beginning of 1998 became 
the first central bank of a transition economy to introduce a direct inflation targeting framework.
8 
Under its inflation targeting policy, the Czech National Bank preserves the right to intervene on 
the foreign exchange market if there are “major deviations of the exchange rate that are not 
connected with domestic economic fundamentals and domestic monetary policy” (CNB, 1998, p. 
46). A strong motivation for the CNB to avoid large currency misalignments is the high openness 
of the Czech economy in terms of exports and imports.
9  
As shown in Figure 1, the koruna was on a steady appreciating path from 1998 until the end of 
2002, brought about by the massive privatisation of the corporate sector and greenfield 
investments, which resulted in an FDI inflow of around USD 30 billion
10 between 1998 and 2002. 
Table 2 shows a collection of official statements from 1998 to 2002 confirming that the CNB 
intervened on the foreign exchange market during this period in order to smooth the appreciation 
of the koruna vis-à-vis the German mark and the euro. In addition, contrary to other central banks, 
the CNB’s FX interventions were clearly aimed at changes in the exchange rate and not its 
volatility. 
                                            
8 For a very comprehensive treatment of inflation targeting in the Czech Republic, see Coats (2000). 
9 The ratio ((X+M)/2)/GDP was around 50% in 1997, increased to about 60% by 2000 and stabilised at   
approximately 56% at the end of 2002. 
10 billion = 10
9 ; Table 1 shows that the stock of FDI grew from about 23% of GDP in 1998 to 47% of GDP in 
2002.
 Foreign Exchange Interventions and Interest Rate Policy in the Czech Republic   7 
 
 
Table 2: Overview of the CNB’s Objectives on the FX Market 
Source Year  Statement 
Šmídkova et al. 
(1998, pp. 10–11) 
1997  The CNB announced that “the average koruna exchange rate should float in the 
range of 17–19.5 CZK/DEM”; the CNB intervened in both directions to limit 
exchange rate variability. 
CNB (1998, p. 33)  1998  “The CNB intervened on the foreign exchange market to moderate the 
appreciation pressures generated by the foreign capital inflow.” 
CNB (1999, p. 45)  1999  “The koruna’s exchange rate was affected by the CNB’s interventions to 
prevent an excessive koruna appreciation.” 
CNB (2000, p. 48)  2000  “The koruna’s nominal exchange rate against the euro exhibited an overall 
appreciation tendency in 2000. This gradual strengthening was interrupted at 
end-Q1 by the CNB’s foreign exchange interventions to prevent excessive 
appreciation of the koruna…” 
CNB (2002, p. 36)  2002  “The koruna continued to appreciate (…). As a result, at its extraordinary 
meeting on 21 January 2002 the Bank Board (…) also approved intervention in 
the foreign exchange market.” 
  2003–2005  No FX interventions 
Note: The year column indicates the year to which the statement pertains. 
Along these lines, off-market operations concerted between the CNB, the Ministry of Finance and 
the National Property Fund were also undertaken between 2000 and 2002 to neutralise the effects 
of privatisation revenues on the exchange rate (CNB, 2001, 2002). 
2.2 Overview of Official FX Interventions from 1997 to 2002 
Figure 3 and Table 3 provide an overview of the CNB’s intervention activity on the foreign 
exchange markets, according to which the Czech central bank both sold and purchased the 
domestic currency in the aftermath of the currency crisis in 1997. Although it also purchased 
koruna in 1998 on a few occasions, from 1998 to late 2002 the Czech monetary authorities’ 
interventions took the shape of koruna sales to smooth the appreciation or even to try to weaken 
the Czech currency. The CNB did not intervene on the FX market between 2003 and mid-2005. 















Source: Czech National Bank 
Note: Interventions are in billions of Czech koruna. Negative (positive) values show koruna purchases 
(sales).The exchange rate is shown as the deviation from the period average koruna/euro 
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Table 3: Summary of Intervention Activities of the Czech National Bank, 1997:06–2002:12 
(CZK billions) 
   Mean  Median Min  Max  SD  Days  of  intervention
1997 Total  2.88  2.42  0.18  8.69  2.03  40 
 Sales  2.81  2.52  0.18  8.59  1.82  27 
 Purchases  3.03  2.13  0.95  8.69  2.49  13 
1998 Total  1.94  1.46  0.19  10.75  2.26  37 
 Sales  1.95  1.46  0.19  10.75  2.38  33 
 Purchases  1.84  1.83  0.99  2.72  0.99  4 
1999 Total  4.10  0.81  0.22  18.76  7.16  10 
 Sales  4.10  0.81  0.22  18.76  7.16  10 
 Purchases  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0 
2000 Total  4.45  1.27  0.36  11.49  5.24  5 
 Sales  4.45  1.27  0.36  11.49  5.24  5 
 Purchases  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0 
2001 Total  5.64  2.52  2.33  12.08  5.57  3 
 Sales  5.64  2.52  2.33  12.08  5.57  3 
 Purchases  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0 
2002 Total  1.91  0.91  0.10  12.06  2.84  37 
 Sales  1.91  0.91  0.10  12.06  2.84  37 
 Purchases  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0 
1997–2002 Total  2.56  1.43 0.10  18.76 3.24  132 
 Sales  2.53  1.42  0.10  18.76  3.37  115 
 Purchases  2.75  2.13  0.95  8.69  2.26  17 
 
3. The Event Study Approach 
3.1 Defining the Event and the Effectiveness of an Event 
A big advantage of the event study approach over time series techniques is that it only looks at 
periods when interventions take place and is thus able to filter out longer periods during which no 
interventions happen and which may cause econometric studies to find no relation between 
foreign exchange interventions and exchange rate behaviour (Fatum, 2000; Fatum and 
Hutchinson, 2003). 
When applying the event study approach, three issues have to be tackled:  
a)  how single interventions in one direction can form a single intervention episode or event: 
The question is: how many days must separate two single intervention acts going in the same 
direction (both purchases or both sales) for those acts to be considered as two distinct intervention 
events. Five alternative definitions of the intervention event are considered in this study. We 
consider intervention events which comprise single interventions in one direction between which 
up to 2, 5, 10, 20 and 30 consecutive days can pass without intervention activity. The intervention Foreign Exchange Interventions and Interest Rate Policy in the Czech Republic   9 
 
 
event ends if more than 2, 5, 10, 20 or 30 days go by without intervention or if an intervention in 
the other direction takes place.
11 
b)  how long a time horizon should be analysed before and after the intervention event 
(definition of pre- and post-event windows): 
As to the size of the pre- and post-event windows, we look at six different lengths: 2, 5, 10, 20, 
30, 40 and 60. The pre- and post-event windows are constructed in a symmetric way, implying 
that a 2-day (5-day etc.) pre-event window is compared to a 2-day (5-day etc.) post-event 
window.
12 In addition, effectiveness is analysed for the event window itself. The pre-event 
window is set to 2, 5, 10, 20 and 30 days if the event window size is equal to or less than 2 days 
(greater than 2 (5, 10, 20 and 30) but equal to or less than 5 (10, 20 and 30)). 
It may happen that the pre-/post-window overlaps with one or more previous/next intervention 
episode, especially as the pre- and post-event window sizes increase. In such a case, the outcome 
of the analysis will reflect the joint effect of the overlapping intervention episodes and not the one 
we are interested in. Against this background, we focus on the pre- and post-event windows which 
do not overlap with other intervention episodes. In what follows, we refer to the non-overlapping 
pre- and post-event windows as “assessable” using shaded cells in Table 3 and the word 
ASSESSABLE in Tables 4 and 5. 
c)  under what circumstances an intervention episode can be viewed as effective/successful: 
The following three types of intervention can be distinguished. 
Leaning against the wind (breaking/reversing the trend; WIND): central bank interventions 
reverse the exchange rate trend, i.e. the exchange rate depreciates (appreciates) in the pre-event 
window, and, following purchases (sales) of the domestic currency, it appreciates (depreciates) in 
the post-event window.  
Smoothing exchange rate movements (dampening or slowing the trend; SMOOTH): central bank 
interventions slow down the appreciation or depreciation of the domestic currency, i.e. buying 
(selling) the domestic currency causes the exchange rate to depreciate less (appreciate less) in the 
post-event window than in the pre-event window.
13 
Leaning with the wind (WITH): purchases (sales) of the domestic currency should cause the 
exchange rate to appreciate more (depreciate more) after the intervention episode than before the 
intervention episode. As most central banks intervene in an attempt either to dampen or to reverse 
the exchange rate trend, a finding that interventions are leaning with the wind may simply indicate 
the failure of official FX interventions. For this reason, we drop leaning with the wind for the rest 
of the paper and classify it as failure. 
                                            
11 Fatum (2000) and Fatum and Hutchison (2003) use up to 15 days and Edison et al. (2003) use up to 10 days 
with no intervention between two neighbouring interventions within an event. 
12 Fatum (2000) employs 2, 5, 10, and 15-day window sizes, while Edison et al. (2003) look at 2-day and 21-day 
windows. Edison and others refer to the 2-day window as the short term and the 21-day window as the long 
term. 
13 In contrast to Fatum (2005), Fatum and Hutchison (2003) and Fratzscher (2005), our definition of exchange 
rate smoothing does not encompass leaning against the wind interventions, as in our case exchange rate 
smoothing implies a weakening of an ongoing trend (less appreciation or less depreciation) whereas leaning 
against the wind refers to events when the trend on the FX markets reverses as a result of FX interventions 
(appreciation instead of depreciation and depreciation instead of appreciation). 10   Balázs Égert, Luboš Komárek  
 
 
In general, it should be emphasised that the analysis of the effectiveness of FX interventions on 
the basis of the aforementioned success categories allows an ex post judgment of the effectiveness 
of FX interventions, i.e. observation of the actual outcome. Nevertheless, the comparison of the ex 
post outcomes and the stated policy objective may give us a rough idea of how effectively the 
central bank’s intentions prior to the realisation of FX interventions materialise on the FX market.  
Finally, not only changes in the exchange rate, but also changes in the volatility of the exchange 
rate can be analysed. For this purpose, volatilities – measured as the standard deviation over the 
(symmetric) pre- and post-event windows – are compared with one another. 
3.2 Statistical Measure of the Effectiveness of FX Interventions 
Although it is convenient to analyse the effectiveness of FX interventions in a descriptive way, it 
may be also interesting to carry out formal statistical tests to verify whether the measured success 
of the individual intervention events can be viewed as statistically significant or just as a random 
phenomenon. For this purpose, we apply the non-parametric sign test. This is frequently used in 
event studies (MacKinley, 1997, p. 32) in general and has been extensively used in recent years in 
the literature on FX interventions (Humpage, 1999; Fatum, 2000, 2005; Fatum and Hutchison, 










+ N  is the number of successful events, N is the total number of non-overlapping events, 
µ  is a probability parameter and  ) 1 , 0 ( ~ N S . There is indeed a probability of 50% ( 5 . 0 = µ ) 
that the exchange rate will appreciate (depreciate) in period t+1 as compared to a depreciation 
(appreciation) in period t. Hence, the non-parametric sign test investigates whether the number of 
leaning against the wind type of successes is significantly larger than 50%. In other words, the 
sign test examines whether the null hypothesis of a random change in the exchange rate can be 
rejected against the alternative of a systematic change (due to FX interventions in our case). In a 
similar vein, the probability of the exchange rate depreciating (appreciating) less but not switching 
to an appreciation (depreciation) in the case of exchange rate smoothing is 25% ( 25 . 0 = µ ).
14 The 
sign test can also be easily applied to analyse whether FX volatility increases or decreases 
significantly after FX interventions. 
3.3 The Role of Interest Rates 
An intriguing question to be addressed in the context of FX interventions is whether changes in 
the exchange rate occur only as a result of FX interventions or because other factors also interfere 
with the impact of FX interventions. Interest rate movements have a prominent role in this 
respect, as FX interventions may turn out to be effective partly because they are supported by 
interest rate moves. In particular, if domestic currency purchases (sales) are accompanied by an 
increase (decrease) in the domestic reference interest rate or a decrease (increase) in the foreign 
interest rate, the FX intervention may be more effective. Hence, it seems meaningful to get rid of 
events during which domestic or foreign interest rate moves take place (Fatum and Hutchison, 
2003). 
                                            
14 When exchange rate smoothing is defined as including leaning against the wind, the probability parameter 
takes the value of 0.75, as the 0.5 for leaning against the wind and the 0.25 for exchange rate smoothing add up. Foreign Exchange Interventions and Interest Rate Policy in the Czech Republic   11 
 
 
Therefore, in a second step, only those events during which no supportive interest rate move can 
be observed are considered. In addition, the condition of having no overlap in the pre- and post-
event windows with other intervention episodes has to be extended in such a way that the pre-and 
post-event windows cannot contain either other intervention episodes or any changes in domestic 
or foreign reference interest rates. 
Table 4: Interest Rate Moves Consistent with FX Interventions 
FX interventions  Domestic interest rate Foreign interest rate 
Domestic currency sale  decrease  increase 
Domestic currency purchase increase decrease 
 
Finally, it is also relevant for our purposes to disentangle the effect of pure interest rate moves on 
the exchange rate. Against this backdrop, we construct so-called interest rate events using the 
same event and pre- and post-window definitions as for the FX intervention events. Success is 
evaluated as follows:  
Leaning against the wind (breaking/reversing the trend; WIND): a domestic interest rate cut 
(hike) or an increase (decrease) in the foreign interest rate causes exchange rate depreciation 
(appreciation) instead of the appreciation (depreciation) observed in the pre-event window.  
Smoothing exchange rate movements (SMOOTH): a domestic interest rate cut (hike) leads to less 
appreciation (depreciation) in the post-event window than in the pre-event window. Similarly, 
increases (decreases) in the foreign interest rate bring about less appreciation (depreciation) after 
the event.  
Table 5: Summary of Interest Rate Moves 
    Czech National Bank  Bundesbank/ECB 
    Min  Max No. of changes Min Max  No. of changes
1997  Total -10.00 3.70 25  --  --  0 
  Towards appreciation  0.30 3.70 2  --  --  0 
  Towards depreciation  -10.00 -0.20 23  --  --  0 
1998  Total -1.00 0.25 8  --  --  0 
  Towards appreciation  0.25 0.25 1  --  --  0 
  Towards depreciation  -1.00 -0.50 7  --  --  0 
1999  Total -0.75 -0.25 11  -0.50 0.50  2 
  Towards appreciation  --  --  0  -0.50 -0.50  1 
  Towards depreciation  -0.75 -0.25 11  0.50 0.50  1 
2000  Total --  --  0  0.25 0.50  6 
  Towards appreciation  --  --  0  --  --  0 
  Towards depreciation  --  --  0  0.25 0.50  6 
2001  Total -0.50 0.25 3  -0.50 -0.25  4 
  Towards appreciation  0.25 0.25 1  -0.50 -0.25  4 
  Towards depreciation  -0.50 -0.25 2  --  --  0 
2002  Total -0.75 -0.25 5  -0.50 -0.50  1 
  Towards appreciation  --  --  0  -0.50 -0.50  1 
  Towards depreciation  -0.75 -0.25 5  --  --  0 
1997–2002  Total -10.00 3.70 52  -0.50 0.50  13 
  Towards appreciation  0.25 3.70 4  -0.50 -0.25  6 
  Towards depreciation  -10.00 -0.20 48  0.25 0.50  7 
Source: Czech National Bank, Deutsche Bundesbank and Oesterreichische Nationalbank. 
Note: Towards appreciation (depreciation) means an interest rate hike (cut) by the CNB and an 




As shown in Table 6, the number of intervention episodes in the Czech Republic varies between 
29 (maximum 2 days of no intervention) and 18 (maximum 30 days of no intervention). Filtering 
out intervention events during which changes in the domestic and foreign reference interest rates 
also occurred, the number of episodes drops by 7 or 8. The number of events identified is higher 
for interest rate events especially for the 2-day, 5-day and 10-day definitions and decreases less 
when overlaps with FX interventions are filtered out. In general, the number of episodes appears 
to be fairly robust to the use of the 10-day, 20-day and 30-day filters for FX interventions, but is 
less stable for interest rate events.
15 
Table 6. Number of intervention episodes identified, 1997:06 to 2002:12 
Maximum days of intervention inactivity between 
two consecutive interventions 
FX intervention events 
2 days  5 days  10 days   20 days   30 days 
29 22  21  18  18 
FX intervention events 
adjusted for interest rate moves 
21 14  13  11  11 
Interest rate events 
51 44  41  31  20 
Interest rate events 
adjusted for FX interventions 
41 41  35  24  13 
 
Table 7a reports results regarding the relationship between the exchange rate and exchange rate 
volatility on the one hand, and FX intervention events established on the basis of 30-day no-
intervention on the other hand. Marked in yellow are the pre- and post-event windows without any 
overlap with previous or forthcoming intervention episodes. In Table 7b we report results for 
intervention episodes during which no interest rate moves happened. Correspondingly, yellow 
cells indicate the absence of any overlap between the pre- and post-event windows and any 
foreign or domestic interest rate moves. Finally, Table 7c shows results for interest rate events 
adjusted for FX interventions. Similarly, the yellow cells in Table 7c indicate that the pre- and 
                                            
15 The source of daily foreign exchange intervention data is the Czech National Bank. The sample period spans 
from January 1997 to the end of 2002. Note that the CNB did not intervene on the FX market between the end of 
2002 and late 2005 (when the draft of this paper was completed). The interventions are expressed in terms of 
domestic currency because the sample period covers the switch from the German mark to the euro. Expressing 
interventions in the same currency units ensures full comparability. Note also that the Czech National Bank 
intervened in US dollar once in July 1997. As stated in CNB (1997), the managed float was, however, oriented 
to the German mark. In accordance with common practice in the literature, purchases (sales) of foreign currency 
are positive (negative) values. Thus, purchases (sales) of domestic currencies are denoted with negative 
(positive) figures. The exchange rate series against the German mark and the euro are provided by the Czech 
National Bank. Only data for trading days are considered for the study, implying the exclusion of weekends and 
public holidays. For interest rates, the reference rates of the CNB, the Deutsche Bundesbank and, from 1999, the 
ECB are used. Foreign Exchange Interventions and Interest Rate Policy in the Czech Republic   13 
 
 
post-event windows do not contain any other interest rate event or FX interventions.
16 However, 
summary statistics for events established using intervention inactivity between two consecutive 
interventions of 2, 5, 10 and 30 days are given in Tables 4 and 5.  
As can be seen in Table 7a, it is very difficult to assess the effectiveness of the intervention events 
in 1997 and early 1998, because of the overlaps between individual events. This seems to be no 
problem for the second half of the period. There are only four events consisting in koruna 
purchases, of which two (No. 5 and No. 9) are found to be completely ineffective, one (No. 7) 
cannot be evaluated at all because of overlaps, and the remaining one (No. 2) appears to be 
leaning against the wind, i.e. reversing the depreciation over a very short time period (2 days). 
Koruna sales during the same period are a little more effective, but only at very short time 
horizons. It should be mentioned, though, that there are a number of overlapping pre- and post-
window sizes for which some of the intervention events qualify as either leaning against the wind 
or exchange rate smoothing. The difficulty in interpreting these results, however, lies not only in 
that they are in an overlapping window, but also in that overlaps occur between domestic currency 
sales and purchases. 
The second part of the period under study, from mid-1998 to end-2002, only covers intervention 
episodes which were all koruna sales. Not only are overlapping windows less of a problem, but 
also these intervention events are strikingly effective in either smoothing or reverting the 
appreciation of the koruna. For pre- and post-event windows greater than 2 days, out of the 43 
assessable windows, only a fraction are found to be unsuccessful, and for the rest success always 
implies either exchange rate smoothing or leaning against the wind strategies.
17 
The elimination of intervention events coinciding with changes in key rates does not really change 
the conclusion for the first part of the period under consideration, but it does have implications for 
the period from 1999 to 2002. It appears that some of the successful events (Nos. 11, 16 and 18) 
drop out and that during this period the remaining intervention events can be assessed only for 
shorter pre- and post-event windows because of overlaps with interest rate changes.  
Finally, turning to the interest rate events, two striking features merit attention. First, it turns out 
that all interest rate events overlap with FX interventions in the first half of the period and that it 
is only for 1999 to 2002 that independent interest rate events can be found. The second 
observation emerging from Table 7c is the relative scarcity of successful events as compared to 
the FX intervention episodes. 
 
                                            
16 Detailed results for different event sizes are not reported here. These results are, however, available from the 
authors upon request. 
17 Our findings roughly correspond to those reported in Holub (2004), despite differences in data frequency and 
definitions.  
 
Table 7a: FX Intervention Events Based on Maximum 30 Days of no Intervention 












2 5  10  20  30  40  60 
Exchange rate returns 
1 1997  4.082  39.010  13  16  3  SALE   WIND  WIND        
2 1997  -0.954  -4.492  4  6  2  PURCHASE  WIND WIND WIND WIND    WIND WIND 
3 1997  4.792  27.843  10  14  36  SALE  SMOOTH WIND        WIND   
4 1997  2.046  2.046  1  1  16  SALE  WIND  WIND  WIND WIND WIND WITH   
5 1997  -2.134  -34.871  9  26  10  PURCHASE       WIND  WIND  WIND 
6 1997  1.161  7.042  3  3  8  SALE  SMOOTH  SMOOTH WIND         
7 1998  -0.989  -4.652  3  5  1  PURCHASE WIND WIND WIND WITH WIND WIND WIND 
8 1998  0.196  51.453  30  56  36  SALE  WIND  WITH  WITH  WITH       
9 1998  -2.721  -2.721  1  1  24  PURCHASE            
10 1998  0.813  12.986  3  9  311  SALE  WIND  SMOOTH  SMOOTH  SMOOTH WIND    WIND 
11 1999  18.757  35.257  2  4  49  SALE    WIND  WIND  WIND  SMOOTH  SMOOTH SMOOTH 
12 1999  0.899  6.097  9  11  62  SALE    WIND  SMOOTH    SMOOTH  SMOOTH  
13 2000  11.491  13.228  3  4  164  SALE  WIND    WIND  WIND  WIND  SMOOTH  SMOOTH 
14 2000  8.651  8.651  1  1  225  SALE    WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND 
15 2001  12.080  14.603  2  2  38  SALE  WIND  WIND  WIND  SMOOTH  SMOOTH    
16 2001  2.332  13.064  5  25  45  SALE  WIND  WIND  SMOOTH  SMOOTH  SMOOTH SMOOTH SMOOTH 
17 2002  11.513  31.281  5  5  61  SALE    SMOOTH  SMOOTH  WIND  WIND  WIND SMOOTH 
18 2002  1.169  28.696  28  53  50  SALE  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND WIND 
Exchange rate volatility 
1 1997  4.082  39.010  13  16  3  SALE  LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW 
2 1997  -0.954  -4.492  4  6  2  PURCHASE  LOW LOW  HIGH  LOW LOW LOW LOW 
3 1997  4.792  27.843  10  14  36  SALE  LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW 
4 1997  2.046  2.046  1  1  16  SALE  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
5 1997  -2.134  -34.871  9  26  10  PURCHASE  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
6 1997  1.161  7.042  3  3  8  SALE  LOW  LOW LOW LOW  HIGH LOW LOW 
7  1998  -0.989  -4.652  3  5  1 PURCHASE  LOW HIGH  LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW 
8  1998  0.196  51.453  30 56 36  SALE  HIGH HIGH  HIGH LOW LOW HIGH HIGH 
9 1998  -2.721  -2.721  1  1  24  PURCHASE  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
10 1998  0.813  12.986  3  9  311  SALE  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW HIGH HIGH HIGH 
11 1999  18.757  35.257  2  4  49  SALE  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH 
12 1999  0.899  6.097  9  11  62  SALE  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  LOW LOW 
13 2000  11.491  13.228  3  4  164  SALE  LOW  LOW  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH 
14 2000  8.651  8.651  1  1  225  SALE  HIGH  LOW  HIGH  HIGH  LOW  HIGH  HIGH 
15 2001  12.080  14.603  2  2  38  SALE  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH 
16 2001  2.332  13.064  5  25  45  SALE  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW LOW LOW 
17 2002  11.513  31.281  5  5  61  SALE  LOW  LOW  LOW  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH 
18 2002  1.169  28.696  28  53  50  SALE  HIGH  HIGH  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW LOW 
Note: SMOOTH = exchange rate smoothing, WIND = leaning against the wind, WITH = leaning with the wind, HIGH (LOW) indicates that the unconditional volatility in 
the post-event window is higher (lower) than in the pre-event window.  
 
Table 7b:FX Intervention Events Based on Maximum 30 Days of no Intervention, no Overlap with Interest Rate Moves 












2  5  10 20 30 40 60 
Exchange rate returns 
2  1997  -0.954  -4.492  4  6  2  PURCHASE WIND WIND WIND WIND WITH WIND WIND 
4 1997  2.046  2.046  1  1  16  SALE  WIND  WIND  WIND WIND WIND     
7 1998  -0.989  -4.652  3  5  1  PURCHASE  WIND  WIND  WIND    WIND  WIND  WIND 
8  1998  0.196 51.453  30  56  36  SALE  WIND        
9 1998  -2.721  -2.721  1  1  24  PURCHASE            
10 1998  0.813  12.986  3  9  311  SALE  WIND SMOOTH  SMOOTH  SMOOTH WIND    WIND 
12 1999  0.899  6.097  9  11  62  SALE    WIND  SMOOTH  SMOOTH  SMOOTH  
13 2000  11.491  13.228  3  4  164  SALE  WIND   WIND  WIND  WIND  SMOOTH  SMOOTH 
14 2000  8.651  8.651  1  1  225  SALE    WIND  WIND  WIND  WIND WIND WIND 
15 2001  12.080  14.603  2  2  38  SALE  WIND  WIND  WIND SMOOTH  SMOOTH     
17 2002  11.513  31.281  5  5  61  SALE    SMOOTH  SMOOTH WIND  WIND  WIND SMOOTH 
Exchange rate volatility 
2 1997  -0.954  -4.492  4  6  2  PURCHASE  LOW  LOW  HIGH  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW 
4 1997  2.046  2.046  1  1  16  SALE  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
7  1998  -0.989  -4.652  3  5  1 PURCHASE  LOW HIGH LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW 
8 1998  0.196  51.453  30  56  36  SALE  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  LOW  LOW  HIGH  HIGH 
9 1998  -2.721  -2.721  1  1  24  PURCHASE  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
10 1998  0.813  12.986  3  9  311  SALE  LOW LOW LOW LOW HIGH  HIGH  HIGH 
12 1999  0.899  6.097  9  11  62  SALE  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW  LOW 
13 2000  11.491  13.228  3  4  164  SALE  LOW  LOW HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
14 2000  8.651  8.651  1  1  225  SALE  HIGH  LOW  HIGH  HIGH  LOW HIGH HIGH 
15 2001  12.080  14.603  2  2  38  SALE  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
17 2002  11.513  31.281  5  5  61  SALE  LOW  LOW  LOW HIGH HIGH HIGH HIGH 
Note: SMOOTH = exchange rate smoothing, WIND = leaning against the wind, WITH = leaning with the wind, HIGH (LOW) indicates that the unconditional volatility in 
the post-event window is higher (lower) than in the pre-event window.  
 
Table 7c: Interest Rate Events Based on Maximum 30 Days of no Intervention, no Overlap with FX interventions 












2  5  10 20 30 40 60 
Exchange rate returns 
6 1999  0.5  0.5  1  1  13  APPR  WIND    WIND  WIND    
7 1999  -0.3  -0.3  1  1  37  DEPR  WIND  WIND  WIND WIND  SMOOTH     
9 2000  -0.3  -1.3  4  89  53  DEPR  WIND  WIND          
10 2000  -0.3  -0.5  2  25  95  DEPR              
11 2001  -0.3  -0.3  1  1  51  DEPR          SMOOTH  SMOOTH SMOOTH 
12 2001  0.3  0.3  1  1  52  APPR          WIND    
13 2001  0.3  1.0  3  38  36  APPR  SMOOTH    WIND  WIND     
14 2001  0.5  0.5  1  1  14  DEPR      WIND        
15 2001  -0.5  -0.5  1  1  32  DEPR             
17 2002  -0.5  -0.5  1  1  40  DEPR        WIND  WIND  SMOOTH SMOOTH 
18 2002  -0.8  -0.8  1  1  89  DEPR        WIND  WIND  WIND WIND 
19 2002  -0.3  -0.3  1  1  24  DEPR  WIND  WIND         
20 2002  0.5  0.5  1  1  46  APPR      SMOOTH    SMOOTH SMOOTH SMOOTH 
Exchange rate volatility 
6 1999  0.5  0.5  1  1  13  APPR  HIGH HIGH HIGH LOW LOW LOW LOW 
7 1999  -0.3  -0.3  1  1  37  DEPR  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH LOW  LOW  LOW 
9 2000  -0.3  -1.3  4  89  53  DEPR  LOW  LOW  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH 
10 2000  -0.3  -0.5  2  25  95  DEPR  LOW  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH 
11 2001  -0.3  -0.3  1  1  51  DEPR  LOW  LOW  HIGH  LOW  LOW  LOW LOW 
12 2001  0.3  0.3  1  1  52  APPR  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW LOW 
13 2001  0.3  1.0  3  38  36  APPR  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  LOW  HIGH HIGH HIGH 
14 2001  0.5  0.5  1  1  14  DEPR  HIGH  HIGH  LOW LOW HIGH  HIGH HIGH 
15 2001  -0.5  -0.5  1  1  32  DEPR  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH HIGH 
17 2002  -0.5  -0.5  1  1  40  DEPR  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  LOW  LOW  LOW HIGH 
18 2002  -0.8  -0.8  1  1  89  DEPR  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH HIGH 
19 2002  -0.3  -0.3  1  1  24  DEPR  HIGH  HIGH  HIGH  LOW  LOW LOW LOW 
20 2002  0.5  0.5  1  1  46  APPR  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW  LOW LOW LOW 
Note: SMOOTH = exchange rate smoothing, WIND = leaning against the wind, WITH = leaning with the wind, HIGH (LOW) indicates that the unconditional volatility in the 
post-event window is higher (lower) than in the pre-event window. 




Table 8a shows that these results are not particularly sensitive to the definition of the intervention 
events (the number of days of no intervention activity between two single intervention acts). A 
general observation is that as the pre- and post-event window size increases, the number of 
assessable periods drops significantly. However, when assessable, the share of successes amount 
to around 80% for pre- and post-event windows of 2, 5, 10 or 20 days and even to 100% for pre- 
and post-event windows of 30, 40 and 60 days. The share of leaning against the wind episodes 
dominates exchange rate smoothing for short pre- and post-event windows, but the domination 
transforms into exchange rate smoothing for long pre- and post-event windows. This indicates that 
it is easier to reverse the exchange rate trend in the short run than at 30-day or longer horizons. 
The results of the sign bias test largely confirm these findings. The null of random exchange rate 
changes is rejected at conventional statistical significance levels in a number of cases. In 
particular, it is found that FX interventions result in leaning against the wind outcomes at shorter 
time horizons. For the 5-day pre- and post-event windows, this holds for all the event definitions. 
In addition, the 2-day and 5-day event definitions also reveal leaning against the wind exchange 
rate movements for the 2-day, 10-day and 20-day pre- and post-event windows. Exchange rate 
smoothing turns out to be statistically significant at the 30 and 40-day pre- and post-event 
windows. It is worth noting that these results are mainly due to the observations for the period 
1999 to 2002, i.e. when koruna sales took place, because koruna purchases either cannot be 
assessed on the grounds of overlaps with previous ones or are just not successful. Dropping the 
latter observation would strengthen the statistical results even further. 
However, these results no longer hold once the events overlapping with interest rate changes are 
removed from the sample. First, it often happens that the 40- and 60-day pre- and post-event 
windows cannot be assessed. Second, the share of exchange rate smoothing is very low 
irrespective of the size of the pre- and post-event windows. Finally, although leaning against the 
wind dominates successful events, the sign bias test cannot reject the null of random exchange 
rate changes. 
All this implies that FX interventions alone are not capable of systematically influencing the 
exchange rate. Now, the question this raises is whether or not the strong finding for FX 
intervention events also encompassing changes in key policy rates is due to the changes in key 
rates. The answer to this question is given in Table 8c, and it is a clear no, as no robust exchange 
rate smoothing and against the wind outcomes can be found for interest rate events for alternative 
event and pre- and post-event window definitions. Hence, interest rate events alone are not in a 
position to systematically influence the exchange rate, either. 18   Balázs Égert, Luboš Komárek  
 
 
Table 8a: FX Intervention Events 
  EVENT SIZE  PRE- AND POST-EVENT WINDOW 
    2 5  10  20  30 40 60 
2 DAYS  TOTAL  EPISODES  29 29 29 29 29 29 29
  ASSESSABLE (% of total)  93% 55% 38% 24% 21%  17%  7%
  AGAINST (% of assessable)  72% 67% 80% 80% 50%  40%  50%
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.015 0.097 0.037 0.083 0.500 0.659 0.500
  SMOOTH (% of assessable)  6% 33% 40% 20% 50%  60%  50%
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.999 0.110 0.037 0.692 0.028 0.018 0.195
5 DAYS  TOTAL  EPISODES  22 22 22 22 22 22 22
  ASSESSABLE (% of total)  77% 77% 68% 36% 27%  23%  9%
  AGAINST (% of assessable)  69% 71% 67% 67% 50%  40%  50%
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.069 0.051 0.104 0.185 0.500 0.662 0.500
  SMOOTH (% of assessable)  8% 29% 33% 33% 50%  60%  50%
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.994 0.259 0.117 0.199 0.028 0.017 0.196
10 DAYS  TOTAL  EPISODES  21 21 21 21 21 21 21
  ASSESSABLE (% of total)  90% 76% 71% 38% 29%  24%  10%
  AGAINST (% of assessable)  60% 69% 67% 67% 50%  40%  50%
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.198 0.074 0.104 0.185 0.500 0.662 0.500
  SMOOTH (% of assessable)  13% 31% 33% 33% 50%  60%  50%
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.975 0.176 0.117 0.199 0.028 0.017 0.196
20/30 DAYS  TOTAL  EPISODES  18 18 18 18 18 18 18
  ASSESSABLE (% of total)  89% 72% 61% 56% 44%  33%  11%
  AGAINST (% of assessable)  58% 70% 60% 63% 50%  50%  50%
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.266 0.087 0.261 0.213 0.500 0.500 0.500
  SMOOTH (% of assessable)  17% 30% 40% 38% 50%  50%  50%
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.891 0.242 0.036 0.065 0.013 0.028 0.196
Table 8b: FX Intervention Events Adjusted for Interest Rate Moves 
  EVENT SIZE  PRE- AND POST-EVENT WINDOW 
    2 5  10  20  30 40 60 
2 DAYS  TOTAL  EPISODES  21 21 21 21  21  21  21 
  ASSESSABLE (% of total)  81%  52%  29%  10%  5%  0%  0% 
  AGAINST (% of assessable)  53%  55%  67%  50%  100%  --  -- 
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.407 0.385 0.225 0.500 --  --  -- 
  SMOOTH (% of assessable)  0%  27%  17%  0%  0%  --  -- 
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.999 0.385 0.775 0.804 --  --  -- 
5 DAYS  TOTAL  EPISODES  14 14 14 14  14  14  14 
  ASSESSABLE (% of total)  79%  71%  57%  29%  14%  7%  7% 
  AGAINST (% of assessable)  55%  60%  63%  25%  50%  100%  100% 
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.385 0.272 0.250 0.805 0.500  --  -- 
  SMOOTH (% of assessable)  0%  20%  25%  25%  50%  0%  0% 
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.996 0.728 0.500 0.500 0.196  --  -- 
10 DAYS  TOTAL  EPISODES  13 13 13 13  13  13  13 
  ASSESSABLE (% of total)  77%  69%  62%  15%  8%  0%  0% 
  AGAINST (% of assessable)  50%  56%  63%  50%  100%  --  -- 
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.500 0.375 0.250 0.500 --  --  -- 
  SMOOTH (% of assessable)  0%  22%  25%  0%  0%  --  -- 
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.994 0.625 0.500 0.804 --  --  -- 
20/30 DAYS  TOTAL  EPISODES  11 11 11 11  11  11  11 
  ASSESSABLE (% of total)  73%  64%  55%  18%  9%  0%  0% 
  AGAINST (% of assessable)  50%  57%  50%  50%  100%  --  -- 
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.500 0.358 0.500 0.500 --  --  -- 
  SMOOTH (% of assessable)  0%  14%  33%  0%  0%  --  -- 
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.987 0.946 0.775 0.804 --  --  -- 
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Table 8c: Interest Rate Events Adjusted for FX Interventions 
  EVENT SIZE  PRE- AND POST-EVENT WINDOW 
    2 5  10  20  30 40 60 
2/5 DAYS  TOTAL  EPISODES  41 41 41 41  41  41  41 
  ASSESSABLE (% of total)  90%  83%  68%  37%  5%  2%  0% 
  AGAINST (% of assessable)  24%  21%  29%  13%  50%  0%  -- 
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.976 0.999 0.978 0.991 0.250  --  -- 
  SMOOTH (% of assessable)  14%  12%  14%  27%  50%  100%  -- 
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.994 0.997 0.978 0.302 0.102  -- -- 
10 DAYS  TOTAL  EPISODES  35 35 35 35  35  35  35 
  ASSESSABLE (% of total)  97%  91%  89%  43%  9%  6%  0% 
  AGAINST (% of assessable)  21%  19%  26%  13%  33%  0%  -- 
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.998 0.999 0.992 0.999 0.500  0.750  -- 
  SMOOTH (% of assessable)  12%  9%  13%  27%  33%  50%  -- 
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.997 0.999 0.992 0.302 0.147  0.102  -- 
20 DAYS  TOTAL  EPISODES  24 24 24 24  24  24  24 
  ASSESSABLE (% of total)  100% 92%  96%  83%  17%  17%  0% 
  AGAINST (% of assessable)  25%  18%  30%  20%  75%  25%  -- 
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.984 0.995 0.949 0.989 0.091  0.698 -- 
  SMOOTH (% of assessable)  8%  5%  9%  25%  25%  50%  -- 
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.998 0.999 0.996 0.410 0.301  0.032  -- 
30 DAYS  TOTAL  EPISODES  13 13 13 13  13  13  13 
  ASSESSABLE (% of total)  100% 92%  92%  77%  62%  46%  0% 
  AGAINST (% of assessable)  31%  25%  25%  30%  38%  17%  -- 
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.864 0.920 0.920 0.828 0.420  0.881  -- 
  SMOOTH (% of assessable)  8%  0%  8%  0%  13%  33%  -- 
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.980 0.996 0.970 0.993 0.852  0.119  -- 
 
It comes as no surprise that exchange rate interventions are more efficient when accompanied by 
changes in interest rates. A big reason for this is that the interest rate moves included in the FX 
intervention events are mostly in line with the underlying intervention such as outlined in Table 6. 
Table 9 below shows the overlaps between intervention episodes and changes in key policy rates 
for the 30-day event definition and indicates whether the interest rate changes are consistent with 
the FX intervention.
18 Note that the conclusion is very much the same for the different event 
definitions and even if interest rate events are matched with FX interventions (not reported here). 
Figure 4 also gives an idea of how FX interventions are surrounded by changes in key policy 
rates.  
Table 9: Consistency of FX Events with Interest Rate Changes, 30-day Event Definition 
No. of event  Date  FX intervention Interest move Consistent 
1 17.6.97–8.7.97  SALE  CNB  ↓ YES 
2 14.7.97–21.7.97  PURCHASE  CNB  ↓ NO 
3 24.7.97–12.8.97  SALE  CNB  ↓ YES 
5 27.10.97–1.12.97  PURCHASE  CNB  ↑ YES 
6 16.12.97–18.12.97 SALE  CNB↓ YES 
8 14.1.98–1.4.98  SALE  CNB  ↑ NO 
11 4.10.99–7.10.99 SALE  CNB  ↓ YES 
16 20.12.01–29.1.02 SALE  CNB  ↓ YES 
18 10.7.02–20.9.02 SALE  CNB  ↓ YES 
Note: The events correspond to those reported in Table 7a.  
                                            
18 Holub (2004) looks at whether interest rate moves are consistent with the (deviations from the) inflation target. 20   Balázs Égert, Luboš Komárek  
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Regarding the unconditional exchange rate volatility (measured by standard deviations), 
interventions are associated with both increases and decreases in volatility (Tables 7a and 7b). 
There are episodes for which whether or not the volatility increases or decreases hinges largely 
upon the size of the pre- and post-event window. For a number of episodes, especially in 1998 and 
1999, interventions systematically cause exchange rate volatility to increase, while in 2001 and 
2002, they tend to dampen forex volatility. Tables 10a and 10b summarise these results in a more 
systematic way, and suggests that for short pre- and post-event windows, the share of intervention 
episodes for which forex volatility increased equals that of the episodes followed by lower forex 
volatility. However, in the longer term (up to 60 days), foreign exchange interventions tend to be 
associated with a rise rather than a drop in foreign exchange volatility. 
According to Table 10a, higher volatility tends to be statistically significant for the 20-day and 30-
day pre- and post-event windows, while lower volatility never shows up as statistically significant 
(not reported here). This implies that FX interventions may lead to higher FX volatility at longer 
horizons. However, this relationship seems to break down once intervention events incorporating 
interest rate moves are dropped (Table 10b). 
Table 10a: Intervention Episodes and Unconditional Exchange Rate Volatility 
  EVENT SIZE  PRE- AND POST-EVENT WINDOW 
    2 5  10  20  30 40 60 
2 DAYS  HIGH (% of  assessable)  44% 56% 73% 100% 83%  80%  100%
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.730 0.319 0.079 0.019 0.082  0.127 0.195
5 DAYS  HIGH (% of  assessable)  59% 53% 67% 88% 83%  80%  100%
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.235 0.403 0.104 0.035 0.082  0.124 0.196
10 DAYS  HIGH (% of  assessable)  47% 50% 67% 88% 83%  80%  100%
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.601 0.500 0.104 0.035 0.082  0.124 0.196
20/30 DAYS  HIGH (% of  assessable)  50% 54% 64% 70% 63%  67%  100%
  SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.500 0.388 0.186 0.116 0.245 0.222 0.196
Notes: The total number of episodes and the share of non-overlapping assessable episodes are 
reported in Table 4a.   Foreign Exchange Interventions and Interest Rate Policy in the Czech Republic   21 
 
 
Table 10b: Intervention Episodes and Unconditional Exchange Rate Volatility 
  EVENT SIZE  PRE- AND POST-EVENT WINDOW 
   2  5  10  20  30  40  60 
2 DAYS  HIGH (% of  assessable)  41% 55% 67% 100% 0%  --  -- 
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.762 0.385 0.225 0.196 --  --  -- 
5 DAYS  HIGH (% of  assessable)  55% 50% 63% 100% 50%  100%  100%
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.385 0.500 0.250 0.069 0.500 --  -- 
10 DAYS  HIGH (% of  assessable)  50% 44% 63% 100% 0%  --  -- 
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.500 0.625 0.250 0.196 --  --  -- 
20/30 DAYS  HIGH (% of  assessable)  63% 43% 50% 50% 100%  --  -- 
 SIGN  TEST  (p-value)  0.250 0.642 0.500 0.500 --  --  -- 
Notes: The total number of episodes and the share of non-overlapping assessable episodes are 
reported in Table 4b.  
 
4. Econometric Investigation 
4.1. Interventions, Exchange Rate and Volatility 
The effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions is also investigated using a GARCH 
framework, which is admittedly well suited for such an investigation because it analyses 
simultaneously the mean and conditional variance of the exchange rate series. Dominguez (1998) 
used a mean equation specification in which the log-difference of the exchange rate returns ( t e ∆ ) 
are regressed on the intervention series ( t I ), the interest differential (
*
t t i i − ) between overnight 
money market rates in the home economy and the foreign benchmark (Germany and the euro 
area), and dummy variables capturing day of the week effects. The conditional variance equation 
includes the absolute value of interventions, the interest differential and day-of-the-week 
dummies. We first extend this approach by distinguishing between domestic currency sales (
S
t I ) 
and purchases (
P
t I ), which are allowed to enter the mean equation with lags as well. This ensures 
that we can capture the longer-term effect of interventions. We also include the Emerging Market 
Bond Index (EMBI) constructed by JP Morgan to capture the general sentiment towards emerging 
markets. The change in, rather than the level of, the EMBI and the interest differential are used 
( t EMBI ∆  and  ) (
*
t t i i − ∆ ).
19 Furthermore, lagged values of the exchange rate returns are 
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19 Overnight money market rates are drawn from Bloomberg for the Czech economy and from the Deutsche 
Bundesbank for Germany and the euro area. EMBI data are obtained from JP Morgan. 22   Balázs Égert, Luboš Komárek  
 
 
where  t I  takes negative (positive) values for purchases (sales) of the domestic currency. 
3 2 1 D , D , D and  4 D are dummy variables that take the value of 1 on Monday, Tuesday, 
Wednesday and Thursday respectively. 
2
1 − t ε  and 
2
1 − t σ  are the ARCH and GARCH terms. 
Equations (1) and (3) are modified so as to differentiate between small and large interventions and 
one-day and longer intervention episodes. Large interventions are defined as interventions higher 
than the average of the interventions in the same direction over the whole period, and small 
interventions are those below the average of the interventions in the same direction. Ísberg and 
Pétursson (2003) suggest the use of a dummy variable which captures long intervention episodes. 
The dummy takes the value of 1 if a given intervention act is preceded by intervention activity in 
(t-1) and (t-2). In addition to the Ísberg and Pétursson dummy, we use a more loosely defined 
dummy which is 1 if any given intervention is preceded by intervention during one of the 
preceding five days, and is 0 otherwise.  
It has to be acknowledged that our specification is only a partial model, in the sense that other 
aspects of interventions could be investigated, i.e. whether interventions were publicly announced, 
whether market participants were aware of an official intervention at the moment of and after the 
intervention, and, finally, whether and what kind of official statements strengthen or undermine 
the effect of FX interventions on the exchange rate.
20 A related issue is how official interventions 
interact with other factors, such as the arrival of macro news
21 and spillover effects between FX, 
stock, money and bond markets in the Czech Republic and from other major markets (e.g. US, 
UK, Germany) and regional markets (Hungary and Poland).
22 However, such extensions are 
beyond the scope of this paper and are left to future research.
23 
Endogeneity is an important issue at the daily frequency, as, in accordance with professional 
wisdom, central banks usually intervene in response to changes in the exchange rate, and the 
exchange rate may in turn be affected by the interventions. Neely (2005) has recently criticised all 
the commonly used estimation methods on these grounds.
24 However, Fratzscher (2005) argues 
                                            
20 Beine et al. (2004) analyse the influence of commenting on and confirming statements of official FX 
interventions for the DEM(EUR)/USD and JPY/USD currency pairs.  
21 Disyatat and Galati (2005) report results for the unexpected component of macro news (related to the CPI, 
retail sales and industrial production) in the daily FX equation, in which instrumented interventions are also 
employed on the right-hand side for the period from 2001 to 2002. FX volatility is not affected by macro news, 
while news on the CPI and industrial production is found to be weakly statistically significant at the 10% level 
and retail sales at the 5% level for exchange rate returns. 
22 Ehrmann et al. (2005) study the spillover across markets for the US and the euro area without taking into 
account official FX interventions for the FX market. 
23 To approach this question from a different angle, we could ask what would have happened to the exchange 
rate if no intervention had taken place. However, we could at best guess rather than quantify systematically such 
effects, so we leave them to the reader’s imagination. 
24 Although very simple, the use of lagged interventions does not help circumvent simultaneity. Another method 
consists in estimating a reaction function of the central bank in which the probability of intervening depends on 
the distance of the exchange rate and its volatility from a target value. The fitted value for interventions is then 
plugged into an equation of the type of (1). However, the coefficient estimates (intervention => FX) will be 
mitigated if the reaction function has a weak explanatory power (as appears to be the case in Disyatat and Galati, 
2005). The method proposed by Kearns and Rigobon (2005), which is tantamount to using structural breaks for 
the identification of structural parameters in a system of equations (VAR), has received criticism from Neely 
(2005) that such a model may be potentially unstable.  Foreign Exchange Interventions and Interest Rate Policy in the Czech Republic   23 
 
 
that endogeneity causes a downward bias in the coefficient estimates and therefore the 
contemporaneous impact of FX interventions on the exchange rate estimated in the presence of 
endogeneity provides a lower bound estimate for the coefficient.
25 
Bearing this in mind, we simply estimate the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients for the 
intervention series. The equations presented thus far rest on a GARCH (1,1) model. In order to 
check for robustness to the model specification and to look at possible asymmetries in the 
conditional variance equation, a number of alternative GARCH models are also used for the 
econometric investigation, namely (a) the exponential GARCH (EGARCH), (b) the threshold 
GARCH (TGARCH) and (c) the component GARCH (CGARCH). 
For the sake of model selection, we adopt the following testing strategy. First, we allow up to 10 
lags to be included for interventions and exchange rate returns by letting the Akaike information 
criterion pick out the optimal lag length for the mean equation. The different GARCH models 
estimated for the chosen mean equation are then compared in two ways. First, the Akaike and 
Schwarz information criteria are employed. Second, the ARCH (α ) and GARCH (β ) terms, the 
asymmetric term (λ ) for the threshold and exponential GARCH models and the short-term ρ  
and δ  terms for the component GARCH model are analysed in terms of statistical significance. 
4.2 Estimation Results 
The estimations are carried out for the entire period (1997:06–2002:12) and for two sub-periods. 
The first sub-period covers the aftermath of the currency crisis and runs from 1997:06 to 1998:05. 
The second sub-period – from 1998:06 to 2002:12 – is the period when only koruna sales took 
place, in order to slow down the nominal appreciation. The two sub-periods are further narrowed 
down by including only 30 observations for the exchange rate preceding (following) the first (last) 
observation for the interventions series. 
For the whole period, the estimation results
26, reported in Table 11, indicate that while 
contemporaneous koruna purchases have no effect on the exchange rate, one-day lagged koruna 
purchases are correlated significantly with changes in the exchange rate. However, the 
relationship is negative, and this implies that koruna purchases are linked to currency depreciation 
                                            
25 For intraday data, say at 5-minute ticks, simultaneity is less of a problem, as interventions and changes in the 
exchange rate can be disentangled properly. Nonetheless, only very-short term effects can be detected in such a 
framework, even though the impact of FX interventions on the exchange rate is thought to take effect in a couple 
of days. 
26 The model selection turns out to be tricky, especially for the first sub-period. For the first specification (with 
separate koruna sales and purchases), both the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria choose the simple 
GARCH model. However,  0 < α  disqualifies this model, and the EGARCH model is chosen instead, as its 
structural parameters are the most acceptable among the three remaining models. For the second specification 
(including small and large koruna sales and purchases), although the Schwarz information criterion points to the 
GARCH model, the ARCH term (α ) is not significant. Hence, the EGARCH model is taken instead, as also 
advocated by the Akaike information criterion. For the entire period, there is disagreement between the two 
information criteria for the first specification. We retain the GARCH model (chosen by the Schwarz info 
criterion) because the threshold term of the TGARCH model (chosen by Akaike) is not significant. For the 
second specification, both information criteria point in the direction of EGARCH. The easiest decision is for the 
second sub-period, as the simple GARCH model is chosen unanimously by all the criteria. 24   Balázs Égert, Luboš Komárek  
 
 
rather than to a nominal appreciation as we would have expected.
27 This finding remains 
unchanged when looking at the first sub-period from 1997 to 1998. The decomposition of 
interventions into small and large purchases
28, used in specification No. 2. suggests that both large 
and small koruna purchases are negatively linked to the exchange rate returns. While this suggests 
failure, the dummy variable capturing the length of the intervention period (
LONG P
t D
_ ) is found to 
be statistically significant and to bear a negative sign from 1997 to 1998, which indicates that 
longer koruna purchases yield an appreciation of the koruna after all. 
Coming now to koruna sales, they are mostly insignificant both for the whole period and for the 
first sub-period, with a few exceptions when koruna sales are significant with a negative sign, 
meaning that koruna sales go hand in hand with an appreciation of the exchange rate. This also 
points in the direction of failure. 
LONG S
t D
_  also becomes negative for the first sub-period, and this 
largely confirms the previous story.  
Let us now turn to the sub-period running from 1998 to 2002, which contains only koruna sales. 
During this period, koruna sales in specification 1 and only large koruna sales specification 2 
enter significantly and with a positive sign. Hence, koruna sales seem to have the expected effect 
on the exchange rate by leading to a depreciation. The length of the intervention (
LONG S
t D
_ ) does 
not seem to play a role. Finally, changes in the interest differential are systematically insignificant 
across all specifications and periods. The EMBI, reflecting overall emerging market riskiness, is 
found significant with a positive sign for the first sub-period when using aggregated intervention 
data. Although this finding is not very robust, it may indicate that the exchange rate changes may 
have been partly driven by changes in overall market sentiment: an increase in the EMBI indicates 
an increase in overall risk perception, which in turn leads to a domestic currency depreciation. 
We now analyse the relationship between interventions and exchange rate volatility. According to 
the conditional variance equations reported in Table 11, it is fair to say that koruna sales and 
purchases tend to be associated with an increase in forex volatility. In particular, koruna purchases 
turn out to lead to higher volatility in the first sub-period, whereas koruna sales have the same 
effect from 1998 to 2002. At the same time, koruna sales during the first sub-period appear to be 
linked to lower FX volatility. Nevertheless, these observations should be treated with caution, 
given that these relationships are not very robust for either specification. 
Although the econometric estimations broadly confirm the results of the event study approach, 
there are some apparent discrepancies. First, estimations show only a short-lived (up to two days) 
impact of FX interventions on the exchange rate. Second, the interest differential is not significant 
in the estimations. This may be – as already noted earlier - due to the large number of 
observations for the exchange rate without interventions. A straightforward extension for future 
                                            
27 Koruna purchases (sales) are denoted by negative (positive) figures. As the exchange rate is defined in foreign 
currency terms (a decrease (increase) indicates an appreciation (depreciation)), a positive relationship between 
koruna purchases (sales) and the exchange rate indicates that purchases (sales) cause the exchange rate to 
appreciate (depreciate). A negative relationship implies that purchases (sales) lead to a currency depreciation 
(appreciation). 
28 Large interventions are defined as interventions higher than the average of the interventions over the whole 
period, and small interventions are those below the average. For purchases (sales), average purchases (sales) are 
used. Thus, what is large is defined by comparison with the average of the interventions in the same direction.  Foreign Exchange Interventions and Interest Rate Policy in the Czech Republic   25 
 
 
research would be to combine the event study with econometric estimations by only looking at 
exchange rates preceding or following by up to, say, 40 days intervention acts. 
One may ask how these results compare with those reported in Disyatat and Galati (2005). Our 
results for the mean equation contradict with their results, as we find that FX interventions have a 
statistically significant impact on the exchange rate. This may be due to the omission of 
macroeconomic news from our estimations. However, other factors may also explain this 
divergence. First, weak instruments may also cause the failure of Disyatat and Galati (2005) to 
find that FX interventions are not successful. Second, their estimation results obtained from 2001 
to 2002 may be considerably weakened by the fact that only three observations for FX 
intervention are available for 2001. 26   Balázs Égert, Luboš Komárek  
 
 
Table 11: Estimation Results 
SPECIFICATION 1  SPECIFICATION 2 
 1997–2002  1997–1998  1998–2002    1997–2002 1997–1998 1998–2002
 GARCH  EGARCH  GARCH    GARCH EGARCH GARCH 
  MEAN EQUATION    MEAN EQUATION 
P
t I   0.000 0.000  
LARGE P
t I
_ 0.001 -0.001**  
P




1 − -0.001***   
      
SMALL P
t I
_   -0.001 -0.002***   




1 −   -0.002**    
S
t I   0.000 -0.0004**  0.0005* 
LARGE S
t I
_ 0.000 0.000 0.001* 
S




1 − 0.000   0.000 
      
SMALL S
t I
_   0.001 0.001 0.002 




1 −   -0.001*   -0.002 
      
LONG P
t D
_ 0.002 -0.005**  
      
LONG S
t D
_ -0.001 -0.002***  -0.001 
) (
*
t t i i − ∆   0.001 -0.001 0.002  ) (
*
t t i i − ∆ 0.000 -0.001  0.002 
t EMBI ∆   0.009** 0.011* 0.008  t EMBI ∆   0.008 0.002 0.007 
  VARIANCE EQUATION    VARIANCE EQUATION 
P
t I   -5.23
E-06* -0.090**  
LARGE P
t I
_ -0.295** 0.236***  
      
SMALL P
t I
_   -0.445 1.323***   
S





_ 0.105** 0.125*  0.000 
      
SMALL S
t I
_   0.272 0.439**  0.000 
      
LONG P
t D
_ -1.044 2.650***  0.000 
      
LONG S
t D
_ -0.265 -1.052***   
) (
*
t t i i − ∆   0.000 -0.350 0.000  ) (
*
t t i i − ∆ 0.058 -0.289  0.000 
t EMBI ∆   0.000** 0.753  0.000  t EMBI ∆   3.310*** -1.344 0.000 
Notes:  e arg l I small I  stand for large and small interventions,  purchase I  and  sales I  denote domestic currency 
purchases and sales, 
e arg l P I − small P I
− e arg l S I −  and 
small S I
−  refer to large and small domestic 
currency purchases (P) and sales (S) respectively.  long P D −  and  long S D −  are dummy variables 
capturing prolonged intervention periods of domestic currency purchases (P) and sales (S). *, 
** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  Foreign Exchange Interventions and Interest Rate Policy in the Czech Republic   27 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper analysed the impact of foreign exchange interventions in the Czech Republic from 
1997 to 2002. The event study approach showed that foreign exchange interventions of the Czech 
National Bank were not particularly effective in the aftermath of the currency crisis from 1997 to 
mid-1998. Importantly, koruna purchases seem to be almost always rather ineffective, whereas 
koruna sales result in exchange rate smoothing or leaning against the wind in the very short run. 
GARCH estimation results broadly confirm these results as koruna purchases are usually 
associated not with an appreciation but with a depreciation of the koruna. Koruna sales have either 
no impact or are associated with an appreciation of the exchange rate from 1997 to 1998, 
signalling failure. However, from mid-1998 to 2002, the interventions - exclusively koruna sales - 
turn out to be more successful in reversing the appreciation trend of the koruna in the short run 
and in smoothing the exchange rate at longer horizons up to 60 days. The econometric evidence 
indicates that koruna sales have a positive relationship with the exchange rate from mid-1998 to 
2002. 
However, our analysis also shows that the effectiveness of FX interventions is closely linked to 
interest rate policy as intervention episodes excluding changes in key policy rates seem to be 
ineffective from a statistical viewpoint. Interestingly, the same conclusion can be drawn for 
interest rate events adjusted for the effects of FX interventions. This indicates that a well 
coordinated interest rate and FX intervention policies may lead to more satisfactory outcomes 
when interest and FX intervention policies are coordinated rather than when they are relied on 
separately or in a uncoordinated way. 
As a side effect of FX interventions, it seems that on average, interventions combined with 
interest rate changes tend to generate more exchange rate volatility from 30 up to 60 days after the 
interventions took place. 
Overall, our results suggest that Czech monetary authorities were capable of altering the level of 
the exchange rate, particularly when trying to dampen appreciation pressures (rather than fighting 
against currency depreciation) in the second half of the period studied. However, this necessitated 
a careful coordination of FX intervention and interest rate policies. 
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Table A1a: Estimation Results – Model Selection, 1997 to 2002 
  Specification 1  Specification 2 
  GARCH TGARCH EGARCH CGARCH GARCH TGARCH EGARCH CGARCH
AIC  -8.182  -8.183  -8.169 -8.072 -8.136 -8.118  -8.179  -7.870 
SIC  -8.086  -8.084 -8.070 -7.938 -7.990  -7.968 -8.030  -7.671 
α   0.159***  0.124*** 0.285*** 0.638**  0.215*** 0.195*** 0.268*** 0.500 
β   0.775*** 0.790***  -0.035  0.189  0.651*** 0.644***  -0.023 0.040 
λ     0.059 0.936***      0.062 0.943***  
ρ       0.032      0.040 
δ       0.044       0.016 
 
Table A1b: Estimation Results – Model Selection, 1997 to 1998 
  Specification 1  Specification 2 
 GARCH  TGARCH  EGARCH CGARCH GARCH TGARCH EGARCH CGARCH
AIC  -7.631  -7.466  -7.611 -7.312 -7.551 -7.532  -7.551  -7.239 
SIC  -7.336  -7.158  -7.303 -6.894 -7.193  -7.162  -7.182 -6.710 
α   -0.002 0.148*  0.179** 0.500  0.092  0.109  0.771*** 0.500 
β   0.757*** 0.596***  -0.085 0.040  0.631*** 0.613**  -0.366*** 0.040 
λ     0.049  0.909***     0.036  0.381***  
ρ        0.040      0.040 
δ        0.016       0.016 
 
Table A1c: Estimation Results – Model Selection, 1998 to 2002 
  Specification 1  Specification 2 
  GARCH TGARCH EGARCH CGARCH GARCH TGARCH EGARCH CGARCH 
AIC  -8.593  -8.594 -8.592 -8.537 -8.587  -8.586 -8.585 -8.444 
SIC  -8.471  -8.466 -8.464 -8.362 -8.435  -8.428 -8.427 -8.226 
α   0.199*** 0.135**  0.242***  0.638***  0.196*** 0.147** 0.212***  0.000001***
β   0.595*** 0.615***  -0.083  0.174  0.597*** 0.613*** -0.067  0.000 
λ     0.106 0.903***     0.087  0.909***   
ρ       0.070      0.016 
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